A Lebanese newspaper has published what it says is a trove of top secret documents revealing how the Trump administration’s attempt to convince its Middle Eastern partners to form a united anti-Iran alliance failed.
The leak, published by al-Akhbar, contains nine documents, including policy papers and minutes of meetings, and the newspaper hints that they may be only the first in a series of leaks of confidential documents on the Trump-led anti-Iranian initiative for the Middle East, formally known as the ‘Middle Eastern Strategic Alliance’ (MESA) and also referred to as ‘Arab NATO’.
The Arabic-language documents, whose authenticity has yet to be independently confirmed, indicate that Trump, from his first visit to the Middle East in May 2017, sought to lure partners into forming an anti-Iranian front, alleviating the burden of the security challenge on America and “milking” local nations by forcing them to purchase large quantities of US-made military equipment.
Saudi Arabia, the documents show, appeared to have initially been the most enthusiastic supporter of the initiative, and tabled its own proposals for regional security with an anti-Iranian bent even before Trump became president. However, outsized hopes and disagreements between potential alliance memers eventually apparently proved too much to overcome, even for Riyadh.
A Saudi confidential document dated 4 July 2019 shows Riyadh’s apparent disillusionment with the MESA concept as Washington was selling it, with the policy paper pointing out that while states would be obliged to “accelerate arms deals” with Washington and conclude an agreement for a joint missile early warning system, the United States did not include a commitment to a NATO-style Article 5, stipulating an integrated military command or the integration of military forces of member countries, in the proposal.
In a separate document minuting a meeting of representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jordan and the United States in Washington, DC on 18 September 2019, US officials confirmed that America would not be obliged “to take any military action in the event of attack” against MESA member states, except to provide “security consultations.”
The Saudi counterproposal outlined in the document from 4 July 2019 envisioned a military-security alliance only, without the political, economic and energy riders tacked on by the US side, which Riyadh indicated it would prefer to conclude on a bilateral basis.
The 4 July 2019 policy paper bitterly constituted that in its then current form, the MESA proposal “achieves important benefits for the United States without imposing any burdens on it, while it achieves very limited benefits for other countries, including the Kingdom.”
Minutes from another meeting of Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Oman, dated 19 February 2019, similarly indicated Riyadh’s irritation at the lack of American security guarantees, with the Saudi delegation saying that “there is no commitment from the American side,” and “it does not offer any benefits to the member states.” Riyadh continued to push its security line in all the meetings that followed, up to the 18 September 2019 minuted meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jordan and the United States in Washington, DC.
In the meetings, other prospective MESA allies, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, reportedly sought to make sure that the new alliance did not impact their ability to diversify arms suppliers. The head of the Bahrain delegation to the 19 February 2019 meeting said Manama wanted some kind of “guarantees that the United States will not abandon this alliance as it did with its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement.” The UAE similarly complained that the US provided no “categorically reassuring” guarantees, with the financial burdens resulting from this alliance to be placed largely on Middle Eastern members.