Tehran, YJC. Prof. Matthew Bunn, consultant to the US Department of Energy, talks about Iran’s nuclear program and its negotiations with the West.
Matthew Bunn, Consultant to the US Department of Energy, in
interview with Mehr news agency provides his view on Iran’s nuclear program.
1- Abbas Araqchi announced that any acceptance of limitation
on Iranian nuclear activity by Iranian side will be temporarily, Does this mean
that Iran shows flexibility even on some difference raisin issues?
Iran has indicated
for some time that it wants restrictions on its nuclear program to be
temporary. This is reflected in the
Joint Plan of Action, which indicates that a comprehensive agreement will have
a fixed term, and after that term, Iran will have the same rights and
responsibilities as other states under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT). In the past, Iran has violated
its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and there is substantial evidence (not
just forgeries and false claims) that Iran done research and development
related to nuclear weapons design.
Hence, in order to restore international confidence that Iran's nuclear
program is peaceful, and thereby convince foreign countries to lift their
sanctions, Iran needs to accept reasonable additional limits on its nuclear
program and additional inspections going beyond the NPT.
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Prof. Matthew Bunn
2- How can the issue of centrifuges be settled?
Iran needs to
understand that it will not be possible to achieve sanctions relief while
maintaining some 20,000 installed centrifuges (much less the 50,000 to 100,000
Iranian negotiators have talked about).
That number of centrifuges would make it possible to make the nuclear
material for a bomb within weeks, leaving the international community too
little time to respond. (Unfortunately,
the centrifuges used to make low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel are the same
as those that would be used to make high-enriched uranium for bomb material —
and a much smaller number of centrifuges is needed to make material for a bomb,
which requires kilograms of nuclear material rather than tens of tons needed
each year for power reactor fuel.) Even
if President Obama wanted to accept an agreement with that number of
centrifuges, Congress would reject it and pass legislation imposing still worse
sanctions on Iran with a two-thirds majority, making it impossible for Obama to
veto. Hence, if Iran wants an agreement
that will lead to lifting the most important sanctions, it will have to accept
a limit of only a few thousand centrifuges.
Fortunately, that could serve Iran's interests as well. All but 1,000 or so of Iran's installed
centrifuges are an older, inefficient model known as the IR-1, which is prone
to breaking. For an efficient civilian
program, Iran could abandon these older centrifuges and rely on the newer
models now installed or the still better models Iran is now developing.
Indeed, iran does not need many centrifuges of any type to
achieve its stated goal of providing reliable fuel supply for Iran's
reactors. To ensure that it will have
all the fuel it needs for its reactors, Iran could take several steps. First, it would make sense to negotiate an
extension of the current 10-year fuel supply contract with Russia, perhaps to
20 years. Second, Iran could purchase
fabricated fuel and store it at the reactor site in case there's ever an
interruption of foreign fuel supply.
South Korea, for example, which relies on nuclear energy for a major
part of its electricity supply, typically stores a couple of year's worth of
fuel to avoid any interruptions. Third,
in the event of an interruption in fuel supply, Iran could draw on the IAEA
fuel bank now being established in Kazakhstan.
It's important to understand that having tens of thousands
of centrifuges in Iran does not actually solve the reliable fuel problem, for
several reasons. First, Russia owns the
fuel design for the fuel for the Bushehr reactor, and would no longer guarantee
safety if Iran designed fuel of its own to use in that reactor (or other future
Iranian plants). It's better to use the
fuel the reactors are designed to use.
Second, Iran has relatively limited uranium supplies, which could not
provide enough fuel for a long-term reliable supply for Iran's reactors. Third, having an enrichment plant does not
mean the plant will operate reliably — even if outsiders are not trying to
sabotage it. Years ago, for example, an
earthquake destroyed a major portion of the centrifuges in Pakistan's
enrichment plant.
In short, the path to an agreement is an arrangement in
which Iran would agree to a limit somewhere in the range of 1,000-5,000
centrifuges (with various other constraints to build confidence that there
would be no covert facilities and that Iran could not rapidly produce bomb
material), in return for lifting nuclear-related sanctions and various steps to
ensure that Iran will have reliable fuel supply for its nuclear energy program.
3- Do you think that the two sides are focusing on reaching
a deal till20th of July or they are going to extend the period?
Both sides have strong incentives to try to get a deal by
July 20. But that will be a very
difficult goal to accomplish, given the wide gaps between the two sides'
positions on some topics and the many complex issues involved. (The good news is that the sides seem to have
reached a common approach on the Arak reactor, which the P5+1 feared could be
used to produce plutonium.) If I were
betting money, I would bet that there will be some form of extension, possibly
for three months, possibly for six.